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| Any political philosophy which is truly political addresses the challenges of its time. One of today's most important challenges is globalization. But the word "globalization" has become so amorphous through overuse that it calls for a new definition. To this end, I suggest three observations from which this reformulation might begin.  1) Plural Globalization  The word globalization is generally used in the singular, as a term relative to economic changes in the contemporary world. If this picture were accurate, globalization would belong primarily to the competence of economic sciences are certainly of primary relevance to any account of globalization, assisted by international legal sciences, by the theory of international relations and by sociology. But for at least two reasons, philosophy is being brought into the arena too. First, philosophy generally works on a very conditio sine qua non of any globalization, i.e. on the capabilities of language and reason shared by all human beings. Second, philosophy, being exlusively concerned with these very capabilities, became itself very early and quickely a global success story. After beginning in Asia Minor and then flourishing in classical Athens, philosophy spreads across the Mediterranean area and gradually extends worldwide. Consequently, the classic masterpieces of philosophy -- those of Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and Descartes, Kant and Hegel -- were read worldwide long before one could even imagine a financial and economic globalization. And long before computers came into the houses of educated people, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein were already there.  The conception of globalization as a merely economic and financial process is based on a reductionism that manages to mobilize against it two groups that otherwise bitterly oppose one another: orthodox Marxists and orthodox Liberals. Both believe that the primary powers at work in the world are economic. Yet the truth is that even economic changes do not have only conomic causes. They are based also on political decisions -- consider, for example, the deeply political roots of Bretton Woods, GATT and the OECD -- as well as on technological innovations, whether military or non-military. In addition, globalization is not confined to a world-wide network consisting only of markets and labor. Rather, its domain is the whole of the free world, including even such things as global tourism. Hence it includes a great wealth of phenomena, which are only partially or not at all economic. The totality of globalization, including its economic components, can be grouped according to its three dimensions.  The first dimension consists of a multifaceted ‘society of violence’. This society operates (a) in war, which threatens to assume global scale through new weapons, (b) in international crime (drug trafficking, slavery, terrorism), and (c) in the exploitation of the environment, which certainly observes no national borders. This society of violence has left a trail of bloodshed through history. This trail is picked up by what might be called a "critical world-memory" which follows the society of violence and keeps its misdeeds in common memory. And if this world-memory preserves, unlike up to now, a non-selective memory of the atrocities, it will help us to prevent future terrors from this society.  Thankfully this wide-spread society of violence is complemented by a still wider-spread ‘society of cooperation’, the second dimension of globalization. Here economics and finance play an important role, along with the institutions of communication, transportation and the labor market. As previously, though, economics is not the only force at work. Philosophy itself, along with its sibling academic disciplines and the other important areas of culture and education, take part in this process of globalization. Further, liberal democracy itself is part of this society of cooperation and drives the tendency of the ‘cooperation’ toward globalization, partly through its promotion of ‘world-memory’. An indication of this is that, even though not all human rights abuses are punished worldwide, they lead at least to a worldwide protest. A common public sphere, indeed a global one, is growing and endorsing a critical ‘world-memory.’ This global public sphere is indeed becoming stronger through the expansion of international law and the growing number of globally active governmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition to these newcomers, such as the World Bank and Amnesty International, older examples should not be forgotten, such as international sporting organizations and the even much older churches.  One should not confuse this society of cooperation with love and friendship. On the contrary, in all areas of the society of cooperation competition is still an essential component. But competition has two sides: one which motivates the effort, risk, and creativity that fosters the growth of a collective human wealth, and another which involves costs. These costs, which are sometimes economically internal, e.g. unemployment, and sometimes external, e.g., damage to the environment, bring forth the third dimension of globalization, the ‘society of shared destiny’, the community of neediness and suffering. This includes a broad spectrum, the movement of refugees with its concomitant religious, political and economic background, civil wars, which are often the later consequences of colonization and decolonization, but also often the eruptive answer to corruption and mismanagement. Natural catastrophes, famine, poverty, and economic as well as cultural and political underdevelopment also belong to this dimension.  All three dimensions -- my first of the three promised observations about globalization -- call for a global reaction to their global implications. And this puts into perspective the dominant paradigm of political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Hegel: the self-contained, national state.  2) Two Qualifications  It has been pointed out that globalization is not the exclusive movement of contemporary history. Indeed, as if to qualify the expression of globalization, there are some pronounced oppositions to it. These include the growing self-confidence of certain regions and the formation of regional authorities, as well as the fragmentation of many mega-cities into separate ethnic and cultural groups and even the strengthening of national sentiment in young democracies. There is, in any case a variety of languages, customs, morals, and religions. If indeed humanity develops into a global society of shared destiny, fate itself will be more immediate at the regional, local and individual level. For this reason, the notion of a world village is highly simplistic, but, in the same time, the oftenly conjured danger of a standardization of our lives is avoidable.  By way of a second qualification, we do well not to forget that globalization has historical antecedents. International trade routes such as the silk road were developed long before the modern era. In Hellenistic times there emerged something of a smaller-scale international trade area with market pricing and even trading centers of international scale, such as Alexandria and the esopotamian（mesopotamian?） city of Seleucia. Further, certain religions -- such as Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam -- spread themselves; they are therefore called world religions. These faiths also promote international pilgrimages to their holy cities, such as those to Jerusalem, Mecca and Santiago de Compostela. In addition to religious pilgrimages there are also ‘epic’ pilgrimages, such as the fables and tales of the sort depicted in Boccacio’s Decameron, which are in fact comprised of material from a variety of cultures and geographies from around the globe. Indeed, much that appears again later in the art of almost all European countires can be traced back over Persia and then to India. And, in addition to these examples from cultural history, let us not forget that the natural sciences have ‘globalized’ themselves through the development of philosophy: science, medicine, and technology.  Following this cultural phase of globalization, inventions from the era of intellectual rediscovery and enlightenment -- such as the compass, telescope, gunpowder, and printing press -- led the way to a second phase of globalization which took place in the early and middle stages of modernity. This is the age, of course, not only of discovery, but also of the colonialism which corresponds to it disturbingly.  The third historical phase of globalization, the one in which we presently live, is similar in this respect. Both commercial inventions (radio technology, electronic media, etc.) and military inventions (first the long range bomber, then the Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) play a roll. Political decisions come into play with respect both to the opening of financial and trade markets and to international organizations such as the United Nations or the World Bank. These practical and historical qualifications comprise the second of the three observations about globalization which were promised at the outset. In so doing, we see once again that globalization is a concept which is both overrated and oversimplified.  3) Two Pinches of Scepticism  Before attempting to respond to the realities of globalization, it will be helpful to observe a couple of the common mischaracterizations of globalization. I want to add two pinches of scepticism to contemporary discussions. The first follows from the insight that contemporary globalization is not really very contemporary after all. In considering the challenges and potential of the modern era, we must recognize one of the illusions that modernity seems glad to indulge in: namely, that every generation surpasses the preceding one. For example, the present moment in history may seem impressive for the internationalization of finance and currency markets, but any historian is sensitive to the manner in which it seems to repeat historical precedents. At the time of the monetary gold standard (circa 1887 - 1914), the trade among the developed countries was on a similar level to the one we know today. In this respect, we are returning only today to the status quo of that era which was interrupted by World War 1, the financial crises of the 1930’s, and World War 2. Whether information is transmitted over deep see cable or electronically is not trivial in itself, but the overall impact on global trade is not greatly significant. And with respect to peace politics, its impact is hardly discernible. Take, for example, the peace treaty which in 1648 ended the Thirty Years’ War, a great terror in Germany. Because the post took one month to get a letter to Madrid, one had to wait a total of about a quarter of a year for news instructions from Spain. Peace only came after four years of negotiations. But neither air planes nor electronic message transfer have been able to speed up the peace process on the front lines of Asia or in the former Yugoslavia.  The second pinch of scepticism is a result of the recognition that the economic globalization that occurs of today occurs only on a moderate and limited scale. In terms of real numbers, global trade happens almost exclusively between the U.S., Japan, and the European Community. And these three hardly allot an excessively high share to exports. Exchange is probably greater in other areas: once again the globalization of science and culture is at least equal to that in the economic sphere.  4) Two Visions  How should the human race best respond to the challenges posed by globalization? In general, there are two fundamental models of social organization. Both have a visionary power, one might also speak of a utopia. On the one hand, civil rights and public powers remove despotism and privately held power, the rule of law and justice take the place of naked power. And public powers achieve this goal through democratic organization. We therefore might speak of a universal vision of a well-ordered legal and political society and an equally universal vision of democracy.  Liberal democracy, in particular, gives space to the free play of human capacities, and expects from this -- indeed from the hard competition this entails -- a great return of goods and services, including those from science, medicine, and technology, as well as those from music, literature, and art. This second vision of a multidimensional prosperity complements the vision of peace, justice and democracy. The final aim is to realize an ancient dream of humanity not unlike the political situation described by the Hebrew prophet Isiah: “They shall beat their swords into plowshares, / and their spears into pruning hooks” (Isiah 2:4 RSV).  Liberal democrats have long dreamed of putting the physical strength often used for war to the service of economic and cultural ends. And when peace predominates, it is thought, in addition a prosperity that is not merely material should be realized. Here is the fundamental question: can what holds true within a community also be valid on a global scale? Can there first be an ordered system of peace and law, such that as it is -- by means of economic, scientific, and cultural competition -- broadly integrated society in which, above all, the individuals will flourish? And in fact: no envisioned society is an end in itself: What counts is the individual in relation to all other individuals, rather than just one or a select few.  Legal and political philosophy accepts and endorses the second vision, but opposes its being made absolute by the suppression of the political through the market. No longer, one oftenly hears, are decisions made by democratically responsible officeholders, but rather by international corporations and entrepreneurs. In many corners, an economic fatalism rules, which says that ‘the economy decides both means and ends’. The goal of the economic power brokers is to marginalize politics -- instead of actively forming anything, politics is required passively to conform. In truth, of course, there are no anonymous forces at work. Globalization is promoted by publicly-named and publicly-recognized people, organizations, and movements -- just as the previously referred to agreements on the liberalization of world markets. And as the domestic market is forced to conform to more general to certain rules, to an internal setting, an analogous setting of the global market is not excluded a priori. It is politics itself -- hardly national, indeed truly international -- which either subjugates to the powers of the market, or forces them into a fair setting through a code of competition as well as through social factors and ecological minimum criteria.  The world community should and must leave many things to work on their own: the creativity of individuals and groups, free competition, and the chance distribution of natural talents and potential. But in many instances the power and responsibility that shapes social and political events is required. Therefore we have to ask the question: If law and justice instead of private power are to rule, if law and justice are to be organized democratically within a state, should not the same hold true at all levels, both in and between states? Is there not, then, a need for a global legal system responsible for the promotion of law and justice, grounded in a democratic organization? Does the best political response to the age of globalization lie in the extension of democracy on the level of the single state to a world democracy -- one might also choose to call it a ‘world republic’? Given the three dimensions of globalization outlined above, any such world republic should be judged according to three positions corresponding to the three dimensions: (1) if it appropriately challenges the ‘society of violence’, (2) if it successfully fosters the global ‘society of cooperation’, and (3) if it makes allowances for the neediness and suffering that must be addressed by the ‘society of shared destiny.’  5) Five Objections  I hope that these observations and responses to the age of globalization appear compelling. Given that they entail a radical break with contemporary political reality, I would like to anticipate and address certain objections. I will treat five of these which seem especially significant. The very first objection was presented by no less a man than Kant. A world republic -- Kant suggested -- is a monster which cannot be governed well due to its bulkiness and intangibility. Is this a reasonable criticism? For citizens of Lichtenstein with its 28,500 inhabitants, Switzerland with its 6.5 million is gigantic and the USA with 265 million is truly a monster, to say nothing of the 850 million in India and the 1.1 billion in China. When a community the size of the USA -- almost 10,000 times the size of Lichtenstein and about 40 times that of Switzerland -- may be goverened well, the first criticism has a certain claim. But in itself it hardly amounts to a devastating argument against the idea of a world republic. Indeed the criticism can be seen as constructive given what it recommends. The world republic is permissible, even morally required, under the condition that it is able to prevent its own unmanageability as well as the potential overcompensation of this unmanageability: too much bureaucracy or even a police state. Here we should be content with a constructive point. A world republic must not follow the pattern of the United Nations and blindly fuse mega countries like India or China together with tiny countries like Lichtenstein. One should first bring together political unities on the continental or sub-continental level. And these new unities could -- in this respect, the model of the EU is of great value -- establish the practice of dealing with most problems in their own back yard, leaving only a few things for the global government. Let us establish a principle of large intermediary regional unities.  6) The Principle of Subsidiarity  According to a second objection, a world republic puts at risk the great accomplishments of civilization: human and civil rights. According to this criticism, only the single state has been successful in guaranteeing rights throughout history. This line of reasoning is correct insofar as (a) it makes a normative claim as to the responsibility to promote and protect human and civil rights, and (b) it points at the empirical observation that individual states have succeeded in protecting rights. There is indeed no doubt that, in the West, human and civil rights are protected by the state first and foremost. (In Europe, of course, the Human Rights Convention also has considerable influence.) At any rate, citizens who presently rely for this protection only on international organizations, fare quite badly.  Nevertheless, to argue that (a) and (b) prove that only the nation-state can protect rights overlooks two things. First, Western governments were the first to put these precious rights into danger: France persecuted the Hugenots, the USA -- founded to a great extent as a response to the religious intolerance of England -- allowed slavery far into the middle of the 19th century. So individual states have violated as well as fostered their share of rights. Second, a good place for a world republic is just where human and civil rights already enjoy a history of some form of protection. Where human and civil rights already have some historically established defense -- partly through the state and partly according to the regional conventions of human rights (set by example in Europe) -- the world republic might hold back from intervention. But when there are enormous violations of human rights, the world republic should only hold back when a humanitarian intervention would cause even greater damage. In principle, though, just to stand by and do nothing is not justifiable.  Like the first objection to a world republic, the second hardly amounts to a refutation of the proposed responses to globalization. Once again, rather, it comes to support our argument through constructive criticism. Here we agree with the part of the criticism that suggests, that sovereign nations should remain accountable for the protection of basic rights in the first place. Only the nation-state has the rank of a first-order government, while the world republic remains only a second-order government, even a third-order in the case of large regionally governed regions. Let us take this as the basic aspect of the ‘subsidiary’ world republic. Being ‘subsidiary’ means two things. First, the republic should not decree things from on high, but rather democratically, built, as it is, from citizens and individual countries. It is not a centralized world government, but rather a world government comprised of member states: a federal world republic. Second, the scope of its tasks is limited to those issues which cannot be dealt with on the national level. The ‘federal’ is, in the same time, a complementary world republic: one that includes rather than excludes the first-order governments. The questions of civil and criminal law, of labor and social law, of law governing the freedom of speech, religion and culture -- these and other tasks remain in the jurisdiction of the primary governement of the individual states. But because of diverse globalization, the primary states will have to work with their fellow primary states. Then, it will be more efficient to give certain responsibilities to a higher, more global authority, such as the coordination of combating crime that does not observe national borders and the determination of the fair rules which govern international markets.  The world republic has not merely subsidiary, but original responsibility for peace between nations and its precondition of disarmament. The first of these tasks on the practical level is the successful abolition of atomic, biological and chemical weapons (ABC).  A subsidiary world republic must be vigilant in preventing any compromise in the basic standards of liberal democrady, which is already achieved by the single states and their larger regional units. Beyond subsidiarity,  the world republic must develop gradually, so that one can try new possibilities, collect experience, and -- first and foremost -- develop an important precondition: a global public sphere. Difficulties in establishing a public sphere already exist in Europe, and even more challenges await it on a global level. To achieve such a world-wide public sphere, it is not enough that we become outraged about far away rights violations. We must also -- as already happens too infrequently in the case of European legislation -- lead the type of debate common within states, to prepare, accompany, and later, comment on parliamentary disussion and legislation, and -- should it be necessary -- to suggest new laws. The sphere of publicity on a global scale is inseparable from a competent world republic: So long as there is no global public sphere, the establishment of a complementary and federal world republic would be unreasonable. It is indeed unpermissible that a lasting global legal system is created through a surprise coup or with the wool over the eyes of the people.  During the period of transition involving a provisional world legal system, in addition to the law of peoples international organizations will have certain tasks to assume. International organizations will realize a certain structure and permanency of international cooperation and they then could realize a global order with rudimentary elements of statehood. The resulting provisional system would call together the entire international cooperation structure to determine the time frame needed to manage a world government with rudimentary formations of statehood.  There is a theory of international relations called realism which sees international institutions only as instruments of governemental diplomacy. Individual states jump into a foray with and against each other in pursuit of influence and resources. In fact, these international institutions are not only an arena for a struggle of power among the individual states, but also a forum for political interaction between states. Moreover, international organizations themselves have some power to set agendas. They are thus able to motivate some reluctant states to participate in negotiations. In the best cases, they even become an authority of arbitration. Individual states will use them when the relative costs of a military solution of conflicts seem to high. In the same direction points their relevance as a point of interstate coordination, they are in fact to be seen as a precursor of a world republic. They help member states to articulate and -- within reason -- realize their interests.  Impartiality -- the central responsibility of public authorities -- may be attributed to international organizations only to a highly limited extent. The standard business of the day involves individual states attempting to exploit international organizations for their own interests: superpowers try to use their weight to push through their objectives, while smaller states attempt to outnumber their larger rivals. For this reason alone international institutions, their organizations and rules, may only help to prepare a world republic. They cannot substitute a world republic permanently.  7) Are democracies inclined toward peace?  According to a third objection, there is a much simpler means to protect human rights than a world republic: namely, the democratization of each individual state. In accordance with the the thesis, that global peace will be achieved through a global democratization, we have to take a ccount of the contention that a world-wide peace politics may be pursued by the means of a world-wide politics endorsing democracy. Thus, a world republic becomes superfluous. And it is true, liberal democracy already protects human rights within states. And certainly, democracy has more reasons on ist side. As the European Convention of Human Rights already assesses the protection of human rights within single states, one has to endorse the establishment of a global commission of human rights which surveys those authorities of larger regions. (The United States, for example, would not pass muster even within times of peace because of its death penalty.) And in particular, individual states are to be protected: their territorial integrity and their political self-determination.  As far as the danger of aggressions is concerned, contemporary political science has married itself to the famous theory of Kant that liberal democracies -- or republics, as Kant called them then -- have very little proclivity to invade other countries. Kant was assuming not that the citizens of a democracy have a genuine propensity to peace, but he rather assumes that enlightened self-interest would bring about a tendency toward peace. In a democracy “the vote of the citizens should be required” to go to war. Further, “because they would have to decide to bring all of the hardships of war upon themselves (they themselves must do the sword fighting, pay the costs of war from their own possessions, to try to rebuild the wretched devastation which is left behind...)” they would hardly ever begin “such a bad” game.  Nevertheless, history calls for scepticism. The new French republic overran Europe with war and pursued its own imperial interests throughout. A still older republic, the United States of America, spread itself westward, acting ruthlessly toward the native peoples. Moreover, the USA first annexed Texas, and then went to war with Mexico to pursue manifest destiny further, resulting in the acquisition of the states of Arizona, Utah, New Mexico, California, and Nevada. At the same moment in history, Great Britain did not hold back from developing plans to become a world power and to spread out its Commonwealth, all while developing internally as a democracy. For this reason political scientists had to weaken their claims: democracies are not peaceful in principle. At best the claim is true, on the one hand, for democracies which fulfill certain very high standards, and, on the other, for the relation betwenn democracies exclusively. Toward other democracies only democracies exhibit a tendency toward peaceful relations, but certainly not toward non-democratic states.  But even against this moderate claim some reservations might be raised. On the one hand, very important elements -- such as equality of women and of the working class, and a higher level of education for the whole population -- were absent from early democracy as well as parliamentary decisions about entry into war and anticipated public debates. But entry into war often enjoyed such a broad support among the people that ‘more democratic democracies’ would have hardly decided the matter otherwise. And on the other hand, enlightened self-interest does not always speak against war. In wars which take place far away, the people at home feel fewer hardships, and they feel even fewer hardships when the enemy is clearly weaker. War away from home can distract from political strife at home, in addition there is mass hysteria. Further, foreign wars can be profitable. In the end, the preparedness for peace could be weakened as soon as most states become democracies. A potential for conflict already has arisen today relating to commercial policy and ecological questions, which could broaden under the influence of grave economic conditions and social problems. There is also a wealth of legal problems below the level of war.  Consequently, the universal duty to establish a legal and governmental order remains relevant, again in the form of a constructive criticism. The protection of rights and peace, which already is achieved by a world-wide democratization, may be recognized. Individual states have a claim -- just as individuals do -- that possible conflicts be resolved through other means than power. They should be resolved through law,  so that in fact a world legal establishment, and ultimately a world republic, is needed.  In accordance with the fourth criticism there can only be a world legal system if a precondition were fulfilled which is actually unfulfilled: a sense of justice common to all human beings, a world-wide consciousness converging on moral standards of right and wrong. We know, such a common sense of justice is lacking already in the West. We should be content with a small example: whoever reads about US legal compensations, multi-million dollar pay outs in certain cases in which German courts at best would give 10,000 German Marks, wonders if we live on different legal planets. Stronger differences show themselves in the attitude toward the death penalty, even stronger toward corporal punishment in some Islamic states or in dealings with dissidents in China, Cuba, and North Korea. On the other hand, there are important commonalities: the laws of equality and impartiality are recognized in the application of law, as well as laws of procedure of the sort audiatur et altera pars (the other side is also to be heard) or the presumption of innocence. Further, nearly all legal orders recognize the same basic goods of subjects of rights: body, life, property, and honor. And the human rights conventions of the United Nations provide further evidence of commonalities. The only thing lacking is preparedness to enforce those standards in an unbiased and effective way. For this reason, the constructive criticism which comes to us through the consideration of the fourth criticism seems almost obvious: More time is needed for a world-wide sense of justice to unfold. But the already emerging common ground is remarkable indeed. It has, in itself, already made world courts possible, including The International Court, the Maritime Court, and most recently, even when not yet ratified, the International Court of Justice.    8) A Right to Difference  According to a fifth and final criticism that we will consider, we are threatened by a leveling off of cultural particularities in the age of globalization. To respond to this, it is said, we must respect the peculiarities on which the social and cultural wealth of the world depends, especially in the identity of individual human beings as bound to their particular tradition. These criticisms are presented by the recently prominent Communitarians, who plead for ‘good fences’, and thus for national separateness instead of global unity. For philosophers like Alisdair Mac Intyre and Michael Walzer, for example, the highest social unity -- in which moral and political concepts such as justice and solidarity have sense and meaning -- has to be seen in the individual state. And indeed, many states are founded on a common history of their members, they have, each on its own, a particular tradition, culture, and language, or even a well defined plurality of languages, as the case may be. They also follow a common set of values, the dissolution of states within a global state therefore would limit the wealth of humanity. Over and above this, the identity of the unit is being threatened which is, in the end, the very source of values: the individual, though not isolated person. It is argued that in spite of all individuality, often in fact to this very goal, individuals belong to certain ‘communities’. These communities strengthen the source of ‘solidarity’, the very definition of human readiness to help ones neighbor. Above all, every community has a right right to follow its own ideal of a common good -- provided that it is consistent with the requirements of liberal democracy.  Such a right to national particularities -- let us refer to it as a right to ‘difference’ -- is favored already by the lack of a full determination of universal principles of right, which suggest that human rights, at first, operate only as a secondary level of social regulation. Only their ‘application’ to particular issues and types of situations leads to the common rules covering concrete action. But neither the particular issues nor the types of situations admit of only one interpretation. History, culture, and tradition have their right too.  Let us think, in a thought experiment, of an ideal lawgiver, a Solon of sorts, or even -- as the discourse theorists prefer -- an ideal parliament, and let us instruct him or it to draw up laws which are equally valid for all cultures. In contrast to an empirically existing lawmaker, our ideal lawmaker has all relevant knowledge at his disposition; he is omniscient. Untainted by particular interests and passions, our lawmaker orients himself exclusively toward the principles of justice, especially those relating to human rights: our lawmaker is perfectly just. Such a magical lawgiver can establish the framework for just laws. He finds, however, hardly a single solution from the standpoint of justice. Even less as one can design a chair from criteria such as comfort and durability, can he find a well-defined norm of law which can be derived from the principles of justice. Cultural particularities stemming from history and tradition belong to the wealth of elements which must be included, among them different preferences and minor settings and other purely conventional things. Economic and other matters play a roll too.  Thanks to his omniscience, the ideal Solon knows about the particularities. Thanks to his justice and impartiality, he wants to let justice prevail over these competing particularities. Hence he acknowledges them equally. The result looks paradoxical only on first glimpse: The interculturally groundable principles of justice are open for different cultures and universal principles might be expressed in a particular form. Here, in a moral universalism which is culturally open, both -- our ideal Solon and the ideal parliament -- find their limits. And because of these limits a participatory democracy is called for. In mathematics it should be different: an ideal Pythagoras does not have the limitations of the ideal Solon. When democratic discourse seeks more than the establishment of universally true human rights, when it recognizes the requirements of historical contexts and political decisions, then it also recognizes a ‘right to difference’. And the two are indeed inseparable: the more rights we want to award to participatory democracy, the more we have to recognize the lack of a full determination of universal principles and the more we have to grant to the right of difference. Otherwise democracy degenerates into the organ of enforcement for an ideal law giver.  Let us take the freedom of religion as an example. As one of the principles of human rights, it demands a religious tolerance concerning the practice of religion which refuses to any community, to deny the right to participate in religion, to"freethinking" and atheism, or even the withdrawl from religious society alltogether. (A religion, which declares apostasy to be a crime, or even a capital crime, makes a major violation of human rights.) Above this minimum, the individual right to a negative freedom of religion, a minimum of a positive freedom of religion is probably required, namely the right to develop oneself religiously and to build a religious community for this end. This two part requirement, as Article 18 already a part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, allows a wealth of open points. Freedom of religion does not exclude, for example, that a community understands itself as christian, jewish, islamic or shinto. A strongly anti-religious or atheistic arrangement of a legal and constitutional order is not required for human rights. Consequently, different formations are justifiable, such as the laicism of France, which overcame the flaring up of Hugenot persecution (that occured despite edicts of tolerance) through the strong break between church and state -- and in Alsace-Lothringen differs therefrom. Founded as a place of refuge for the persecuted religious communities, the USA nursed against the practice of "well-meaning neutrality". Germany on the other hand, like Austria and part of Switzerland, allowed an institutional connection between church and state, but firmly not in the inner circle of the law of the constitution or in the political nucleus. Defined by the reformed national church, Scandinavian countries, and in another respect Great Britain, have a church of national character. Israel on the other hand ensures Christians, Druses, and Muslims full religious freedom, even their own jurisdiction for personal, marriage, and family law and nevertheless grants far reaching privileges to its own people. For example, the costs of religion are born one-third by the state and two-thirds by the Communes. And in a multicultural state like Malaysia three fundamentally different legal systems are in to be ssen in a complicated coexistence: an "autochthonous" law of customs, the Islamic Sharia, and the British Common Law.  In addition to these fine details comes the task of weighing up rights, which, once again -- because of the corresponding "under-determination" -- can be taken differently by different communities. Consideration of the freedom of the press is relevant to this example: Is one -- in the name of protecting rights -- allowed to film (for television broadcast) rights violations such as property damage, kidnapping, and perhaps even genocide, instead of stepping in against them? Another example: Is one allowed with so-called public figures to dimish the necessary right to privacy, perhaps even violate it? A choice between conflicting rights is also necessary when the question is posed as to which evidence in a criminal proceeding should be admissable. Here the defense of the private sphere necessary for human rights is to be weighed against the combating of crime which is also necessary to preserve human rights. Further, within the sphere of positive rights to freedom, the realization of which being restriced by scarcity, another question must be considered: how much of the resources should the health service or education receive? And, finally, perhaps one must weigh up the benefits of the welfare state against the incentive to personal responsibility and personal initiative.  Obviously the underdetermination of universal principles has far-reaching consequences. It is by itself the foundation of the right to difference, namely a universal authorization to particularity, in some way comparable with the right to individuality, which not in spite of but because of universal morality is due to human beings. Because of this right to difference there can be no world republic which stubbornly opposes the nation-state of the Communitarians. According to the view of political theorists like Charles Beitz ，the global political order should be set up as a homogenous world republic similar to a single state. In his conception, possible subdivisions only result secondarily from top to bottom, whereas the nation-states themselves, as an expression of particularity, lose their right. But the right to difference opposes this.  Our constructive criticism of Communitarianism says that their position has value, but what is valuable about it only goes a third of the way. Human beings indeed have the right to characteristics: their history, tradition and religion, as well as language, culture and shared idea of the good community. And because the diversity of these characteristics augments the social and cultural wealth of humanity, it is important that the right to difference will be observed. The second third of the way, however, which the Communitarians fail to go, indicates that the resulting nation-states are not an end in themselves that earns an uncompromising protection. As unities which exist for the sake of human beings, they can change themselves by them and for their sake. They can dissolve themselves, reform themselves, and thereby achieve both lesser and greater unity.  And the last third of the way, the final strech（stretch） unrealized by the communitarians insists that neither states nor foreign citizens are relieved of the universal law of a legal and political order. The relevant principle is called "federalism". Only a federal unity can be a morally legitimate world republic.  For the world republic there are three strategies of democratic legitimation which should be considered. According to the one which bases its legitimation exclusively on the people, the world state will emerge from the will of the entire world population -- comprising the complete citizenship of the world republic. Because individuals have the last word on legitimacy, one could consider this strategy appropriate. As the interests of states are legitimized through their citizens, one could eliminate the individual states as additional authority of legitimation. But the right of statehood speaks against this. So too does the fact that the interests of collectives cannot be reduced to the sum of the interests of their members. For this reason a second strategy of democratic legitimation suggests itself. Because the single states represent both the distributive interests of the single citizens and the collective interests of the population, one could want to eliminate the first legitimation and defend the exclusive legitimation of the individual states, with the result that the collective will of the single-states would decide. But this trammels the membership which should be enjoyed by the individual, which is ultimately the deciding authority of legititmation, and which should be allowed to freely extend beyond national borders. These memberships includes religion, language and occupation, demanding hobbies or every political interest such as that represented by organizations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, or Doctors Without Borders, and further the cultural memebership of dispersed peoples, such as Irish, Jews, and Kurds.  Already because of the "membership across state lines" the exclusive legitimation of states is ruled out, so that only the third strategy remains -- the combined legitimation. Its democratic legitimation the world republic wins through a connection of citizen legitimation and nation-state legitimation. In consequence, all power of the world state comes from this double constituency: the community of all human beings and of all states. And this doubled legitimation must find expression in the organization of the world state. The parliament, its most important organ, must consist of two chambers, an upper chamber of the citizens and a lower chamber of the states. Of the specific constitution of these assemblies one need not, at this moment, think further. That Lichtenstein will not have the same weight as India or China is understood. Which weight exactly, will be decided politically. Anyway, the large regional intermediary organizations could change the situation..    9) A Final Balance: Graded Cosmopolitanism  The world governmnet, which should exist according to the universal obligation to establish a legal and democratic order, would entail a subsidiary and, further, a federal world republic. In it we are citizens, but not in an exclusive, but rather in a complementary understanding of citizenship. The exclusive conception of citizenship corresponds to that brand of cosmopolitanism which defines itself -- along with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (§209, Note) -- “in contrast to the political life in a concrete sense”. The exclusive cosmopolitan, not without an air of superiority, says: ‘I am neither German, French, nor Swiss, but rather I am a free citizen of the world.’ Here world government substitutes the single state, and international civil rights replaces nationally based civil rights. Under world government one is a world citizen rather than the citizen of a particular nation-state. The federal world republic, however, is beyond the simplistic alternatives ‘national or global’ and ‘nation-state or cosmopolitan’. International civil rights do not take the place of national civil rights, but rather the first complements the second. To a certain extent, it realizes a global variation of de Gaulle: a world of separate „Vaterländer“ and large regional polities, but, quite apart form de Gaulle, it is one with a special and (up until now unknown) multiple body of citizens. Whether one is primarily German, French, or Italian and a citizen of Europe only secondarily, the democracies of Europe will have to decide in the coming years. In the end, it doesn’t matter whether one is citizen of a nation-state first and European citizen second or vice versa. In a graded sense, one will be both at the same time, and on the third level one will be a citizen of the world: a citizen of the federal and subsidiary world republic.  10) A Global public  An indispensable institution of a functioning community is a political public (see Höffe 1999/2007, ch. 4.3.3), a requirement that gives rise to problems that are well known at the level of large-scale regional unions such as the European Union. These difficulties are exacerbated even further in the case of a world state, a fact that allows us to forward another and for today last objection: a world state without a world public, a global public, is unreasonable.  Fortunately, attempts towards a global political public can already be attested. They are found, for instance, in the media reports on violations of rights all over the world, which induces reactions by the ‘general public’ virtually everywhere. Kant  was able to state for his own time that “a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world” (Frieden, 3rd definitive article: VIII 60). Yet, he pays attention neither to the danger of a selective, biased perception of the rights violations, nor to the fact that opposing voices can also be heard: collective prejudices, national superciliousness and even appeals to break the law and violate the peace. Moreover, an effective global public has far more tasks to perform than merely function as a medium for the outrage of rights violations:  According to three stages of the principle of the ‘public’ (see Höffe 1999/2007, ch. 4.3), global politics is, firstly, to happen in a public manner so that all citizens are able to engage in it. Secondly, every citizen is to be eligible to vote and is to be able to stand for office at the ultimately decisive institution, the legislature. Thirdly, the citizenry is to be no temporary electorate, possibly complemented by permanent public opinion polling; rather, politics is to be exercised by the entire people, even if it is done so professionally only by a few and limited to the parliament as the House of Representatives. In a participatory democracy, the general public is a critical institution the entire political sphere has to answer to – not only the government, but also the parliament, the judiciary and the constitutional court.  Let us focus on the legislature as an example: similar to the individual state, the world state, too, is in need of a variety of controversies that initiate, prepare and accompany parliamentary debates, and later trigger further amendments if so required. In order to ensure that these discussions actually take place, numerous transnational as well as supranational institutions are required. Without a doubt, a great many international non-governmental organisations already exist, some of which even have considerable influence. They are in a position to convince (in democracies even to coerce) governments, corporations and other institutions to enter into a dialogue with the general public and to accept minimum requirements of both a formal and substantial nature. At times, they even manage to organise civil protest across borders. Nevertheless, most of these institutions – the media; political, cultural and ecclesiastical academies; grass-roots movements; parties and associations –are, so far, still organised ‘nationally’, within the confines of a particular individual state. At global level, by contrast, a considerable deficit has to be attested.  In the process of overcoming this deficit and by way of establishing an effective global public, it is important that all the various interests, voices and languages command roughly the same level of attention. The legal requirements are generally known and uncontested: a global public needs the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of assembly. These negative freedoms are to be complemented by a positive freedom (of the press), for instance in the form of a press anti-trust law. Such measures facilitate the creation of a multitude of competing media, political academies and grass-roots initiatives. A ban on monopolies, oligopolies and cartels in other spheres is justifiable only on competitive grounds (see ch. 15.1). In the sphere of the political public, by contrast, additional democracy-promoting reasons can be found: the positive freedom of the press is indispensable for a functioning participatory democracy. A sufficient level of educational attainment is, for the same reason, also required, so as to establish at least a minimum level of literacy among citizens. For cultures that do not rely on written texts, alphabetisation is no legal-moral precept per se, but in a world society in which the media play such an influential role it becomes an inevitable constraint.  Yet, even when the negative and positive freedom of the press is secured, the various interests do not even remotely command the same level of public attention. Of the host of dangers which exist (see Höffe 1999, 2007, ch. 4.3) I mention only one: the hegemony of a particular language. This follows because a living language is not merely an interest-neutral means of transport. The media of the hegemonic language find a far greater resonance, so that the pictures, symbols, myths and interests of the accompanying cultural space occupy a privileged position. What is more, cultures that are based on written texts receive much greater weight compared to those of oral provenance.  In individual states, the public is an institutionally varied, if not vague phenomenon: it occurs on different levels, possesses no sharp boundaries, and covers all shades of expertise and impact, from professional academic discourse at one end of the spectrum to the tabloid press at the other. Since the public uses different media and institutions to address and make sense of different subject matter, it exists not in the singular but in the plural, as a colourful bouquet of overlapping publics. Many of them have an aristocratic tendency, in that professional politicians as well as particular media and associations command an overwhelming influence.  World society is, by virtue of its greater size and heterogeneity, greatly marked by these phenomena. The global public is relatively well developed nevertheless, particularly in areas such as human rights. For there is a global discourse on human rights that is conducted by a heterogeneous intellectual ‘community’ comprising individual scientists, philosophers, media commentators, human rights organisations, professional associations, the media and public opinion in important states, as well as relevant conferences and publications. Of similar great significance is the interaction between the high courts. Even states themselves must not to be neglected, because within the United Nations and other international organisations they are the entities that ratify human rights conventions and, in so doing, enable the legislative evolution of human rights on a global level.  No matter how optimistic or pessimistic one’s judgement is with regard to the development of a global public, a ninth and last constructive veto suggests itself in the form of a dependency: as long as there is no effective global public, it is irresponsible to establish a subsidiary and federal world republic.  A global public is indispensable for yet another task: the development of a common political identity that encompasses a consciousness of world citizenship and a critical world memory (see Höffe 1999/2007, ch. 12.2). The consciousness of world citizenship, in turn, is a prerequisite for global plebiscites. Provided that the notion of worldwide plebiscites and referenda is generally persuasive, it is only defensible if there exists a consciousness of world citizenship as well as a global political public within which the relevant issues are discussed in a thorough and fair manner. Here, too, a threat emerges that requires countermeasures: in order to prevent that the decisions of the six to eight most populous states crush the interests of all others, the example of Switzerland may be followed and a dual majority be demanded: global plebiscites require a majority by both the states and the world population.    11) Rights of states  As long as citizenries insist on, and make use of, their individual statehood, the analogy between individuals and states gives rise to a new human right. The contents of this right are not new, of course, but those entitled to claiming it certainly are. It is a ‘human’ right of states and is put in inverted commas by virtue of the restricted applicability of the underlying analogy. In order to avoid misconceptions, they are best referred to as rights of states, in that states are seen as legal entities and citizenries are protected as collectives.  There are conditions for the capacity to act that apply also to the state as a legal entity and to the citizenry as a collective. These can only be met in reciprocity, a reciprocity that now occurs at the international level. Analogous to individuals’ negative rights to freedom, three fundamental interests emerge that are relatively transcendental, narrowly defined, dependent on reciprocity as transcendental exchange, and have the status of a right of states:  Firstly, states have, like individuals, a right to body and limb, for the life of citizens  is to be protected not only internally and in a distributive sense, as a reciprocal right between citizens, but also collectively to the outside, as a right of the citizenry against infringements by other states. Secondly, there exists a collective right to property: a right of each citizenry to the territorial integrity of their state against encroachment from outside. Analogous to the right to personal self-determination there exists, thirdly, the right to collective and, consequently, political and cultural self-determination.    These negative rights of states are, fourthly, complemented by a second-order claim according to which states are to be able to enjoy the rights without having to revert to violence and private justice; it constitutes a claim to a state of peace and lawfulness between states. Akin to the case of individuals, there is, fifthly, a right to democratic participation: within the scope of a global order of peace and the rule of law, every state has the right to be not only a (passive) object, but also an (active) subject. The state has a right to equal participation in the world republic. The question as to whether there are, in addition, positive rights to freedom, i.e. social rights, is an issue deferred to a later chapter (ch.15).  An objection against ‘personal rights’ of states suggests itself, in that they contradict legitimatory individualism as the moral basis of any form of rule. This follows because the state is interpreted in a ‘holistic-metaphysical’ sense: as a wholeness (holos, therefore: holistic) that is said to be an end in itself and that some philosophers regard as a metaphysical concept. The objection, however, is only valid if directed at the assumption that there are ‘human’ rights of states without quotation marks. However, rights of states are not unconditional rights, but they are, unlike genuine human rights, valid only under the condition that the universal precept of democracy and the law are recognised both internally and externally. Even under these conditions the intrinsic value of states remains relational and subsidiary: the ‘human’ rights of states serve the citizenry.    I end my considerations with the following remark: The citizenry does not have a moral duty to keep its community alive. Incidentally, here, too, an analogy between individuals and states exists, because individuals have a legal-moral duty to stay alive. Yet, the rights of states forbid any compulsion from outside. The citizenry has to see to it that the degree of legal morality already achieved is not put into question through the formation of either the intermediate continental level or, for that matter, the world republic itself. | 任何一种真正的政治哲学都会对它所处时代的挑战有所应对。全球化是今天最重要的挑战之一 。然而，由于过度使用，“全球化”这个词本身已经含混不清，它需要一种新的定义。为此，我提供三种观点，据此或许可以开始这一概念重构的工作。  1)复数的全球化  在当代世界，作为一个与经济变化相关联的词，全球化通常以单数形式被使用。如果这一图景是准确的，全球化将首先属于经济学的权限这一点，必然与全球化的任何一种说明都有基本的相关联性，并且也得到国际法学、国际关系理论及社会学的声援。但哲学正被带入这一舞台至少有两个理由：第一，哲学致力于任何全球化的一个特有的必要条件：人类所共有的语言和理性的能力；第二，作为唯一与这些特有能力相关联的学科，哲学很早并很快地就在全球范围内取得成功。在开始于小亚细亚并繁盛于古希腊之后，哲学传遍地中海地区，并逐渐向全世界扩展。结果，在人们能够设想一幅金融和经济全球化图景的很早之前，柏拉图、亚里士多德、霍布斯、笛卡尔、康德和黑格尔这些古典先哲们的杰作就在世界范围内被广泛阅读。而且，在电脑进入到受教育的人的房屋很久之前，尼采、海德格尔和维特根斯坦就已经在那里了。  作为一个经济的和金融的过程，全球化的概念建立在一种还原论的基础上；这种还原论致力于动员两个团体，即，传统的马克思主义者和传统的自由党，来反对它，否则这两个团体相互之间将进行激烈的抗争。它们两者都相信，世界最初起作用的力量是经济。然而，事实是，经济的变化并不仅仅是经济原因。它们也会基于政治决策，例如，会考虑到布雷顿·伍兹、关税暨贸易总协定（GATT）以及经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的深层的政治根源；同样也会基于技术创新，无论是军事的还是非军事的。此外，全球化并不只是一个由市场和劳动组成的遍及全世界的网络。毋宁说，全球化的领域是自由世界的整体，甚至包含全球旅游业。因此，它包含着丰富的现象，而这些只是部分的是或者一点都不是经济的。全球化的整体，包括它的经济部分，可以依据它自身的三个维度进行分类。  第一个维度由一个多层次的“暴力的社会”组成。这个社会运行在（a）通过新型武器假定威胁全球范围的战争中，（b）国际犯罪（毒品走私，奴隶制，恐怖主义）中，（c）不遵守国家边界的环境开发当中。经过历史的发展，这一暴力社会已经脱离了杀戮之途。一种或许可以被称为“批判的世界记忆”选取了这一杀戮之途，它随这个暴力的社会而来，并把它的罪行保存在人类共有的记忆当中。而且，如果这种世界记忆（与目前为止的情况不同）维持着一种暴行的非选择性记忆的状况，这对预防社会将来的恐怖行为是很有帮助的。  幸好这一分布广泛的暴力社会被分布更广泛的“合作的社会”——全球化的第二个维度——所补充。在这一维度，经济和金融与通讯体系、交通体系及劳动市场体系一起扮演着重要角色。虽然之前经济不是唯一起作用的力量。哲学自身，和它的兄弟学科及文化和教育的其他重要领域，共同参与着全球化的进程。而且，自由民主本身就是这一合作社会的一部分，它在一定程度上通过自己“世界记忆”的提升促使“合作的趋势”向全球化发展。这表明，即便不是所有的人类权利滥用都会在世界范围内被惩罚，但它们至少招致了世界范围的抵制。一个共同的公共领域（实际上是一个全球的领域）正逐步发展并慢慢认可一种批判的“世界记忆”。通过国际法的延伸和全球范围内积极的政府和非政府组织数目的增长，这种全球的公共领域甚至正在变的更广泛。除了如世界银行和国际特赦组织这些新来者之外，老的范例，如国际体育组织和更加古老的教堂，也不应该被忘记。  人们不应该把合作的社会与爱和友谊相混淆。相反地，在合作社会的所有领域，竞争仍然是一个基本组成部分。但是，竞争具有两面性：一方面，它激发着努力、冒险和创造力这些促进人类集体财富增长的因素；另一方面，它包含着损失，这些损失，有时是经济内部的，如失业；有时是外部的，如环境破坏。这产生了全球化的第三个维度：“共命运的社会”，贫穷和苦难的共同体。这包含着一个广阔的范围：在相应的宗教、政治和经济背景下的难民运动以及内战，通常都是殖民地和殖民地自治化的后果，但同样也通常是对贪污和管理不善的爆发性回应。自然灾害、饥荒、贫困与经济、文化和政治的不发达也属于这一维度。  所有这三个维度——我关于全球化提出的三个观点的第一个——需要对它们的全球含义作全球反应。从而为从柏拉图和亚里士多德到霍布斯和黑格尔以来的政治哲学的主导范式——独立自主的民族国家——提供了新的蓝图。  2）两种限定条件  众所周知，全球化并不是当代历史的唯一运动。事实上，要符合全球化的表达似乎有许多公开的反对意见，包括某些地区与日俱增的自信、区域管理部门的形成以及许多独立的种族和文化团体中的巨型城市的分裂、甚至是年轻的民主政权当中民族情感的增强；而上面的每一种情况当中都有多种多样的语言、风俗、道德和宗教。如果人道确实发展到共命运的全球社会的程度，那命运自身在区域、当地和个体层面将更加直接。据此，世界村的概念高度简化，但与此同时，我们生活标准化通常意义上被诅咒的危险也将是可避免的。  由于第二个限定条件我们没有忘记全球化有其历史先驱。像丝绸之路这样的国际贸易路线早在现代社会很久之前就发展了起来；在希腊化的时代就出现了一些市场定价的小规模的国际贸易区域，甚至是一些国际规模的贸易中心，例如亚历山大和美索不达利亚的城市塞蔬西亚；而且某些宗教如，佛教、犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教在也在这些地方得到传播，它们也因此被称为世界宗教，而这些信仰也促使教徒去他们的圣城如，耶路撒冷、麦加、圣地亚哥—德孔波斯特拉等进行国际化的朝圣。除了宗教朝圣，也有像薄伽丘《十日谈》中论述的那种语言和故事般的史诗朝圣，它们实际上由来自世界各地的多种多样的文化和地理的素材组成。许多之后在几乎欧洲所有国家的艺术中再次出现的东西确实可以被追溯至波斯和印度。而除了这些文化历史当中的例子外，我们也不应当忘记，自然科学通过哲学、科学、医学和技术的发展也实现了它们自身的全球化。  紧接着全球化的文化阶段，源自于知识重新发现和启蒙运动时代的发明导致了全球化的第二个阶段，它发生于现代化的早中期，当然，这不仅仅是发现的时代，也是与之相符的殖民主义的时代。  我们现在所处的全球化的第三个历史阶段在这方面也是类似的。商业发明（无线电技术、电子传媒等）和军事发明（先是远程轰炸机，然后是国际米兰大陆弹道导弹）都发挥着作用。政治决策对于金融和贸易市场的开放以及国际组织，如联合国和世界银行，开始起作用。这些实用的和历史的条件包含着关于全球化的三种观点中的第二种，这是一开始就被预示了的。这样看来，我们再次明白，全球化是一个被过度评价和过度简化的概念。  3）怀疑主义的两个危机  在开始回应全球化的现实之前，观察全球化的几个常见的错误描述是很有益处的。我想为当代的讨论增加怀疑主义的两个危机。第一个来自于这样一种洞见：当代的全球化毕竟并不十分当代；考虑到现今时代的挑战和可能性，我们必须意识到这样一种幻想：即，现代化很容易陷入每一代人必将超越前人的偏执当中。例如，在历史当中的现在这一刻，国际化的金融和货币市场或许会令人印象深刻，但任何历史学家对于任何似乎是重复历史先例的方式都很敏感。在货币金本位制的时代（约1887-1914），发达国家之间的贸易与我们今天所知道的保持着相似的水平，在这方面，我们今天只是回到了被一战、1930年代金融危机和二战打断了的时代的状况。无论信息是被很深的、可见的管道还是电子地被传输，对它本身而言都不是无足轻重的，但对于全球贸易的影响却没有多么重大的意义；而对于和平政治，它的影响则更加微乎其微。以1648年结束的三十年战争--一场发生于德国的极大恐怖行为--为例，由于邮局要花一个月的时间从马德里收到信息，人们不得不等待大约共计四分之一年的时间才能收到来自西班牙的新闻指令，和平在谈判之后的四年才姗姗来迟。但是，不管是飞机还是电子信息传输都没能加速亚洲前线和前南斯拉夫的和平进程。  怀疑论的第二个危机是承认今天出现的经济全球化仅仅存在于适度和有限的范围内的一种结果。至于实际的数据，全球贸易几乎仅仅发发生在美国、日本和欧盟之间，而这三者并没有分配一个过高的出口份额。其他区域的挑战可能更大；再一次说明，科学和文化的全球化至少与经济领域的全球化是对等的。  4）两个愿景  对于全球化形成的挑战，人类怎样才能做出最好的回应？一般而言，有两种社会组织的基本模型，两者都有一种空想的力量，也有人会称之为一个乌托邦。一方面，公民权利和公共权力驱除了专制和个人专政，法治和司法取代了赤裸裸的权力，而公共权力通过民主组织实现了这一目标。因此，我们可以称之为一个秩序井然的法律和政治社会的普遍愿景和一个同样普遍的民主愿景。  自由民主尤其给人的能力的自由发挥提供了空间，并据此期望（其实这需要从艰难的竞争中才能实现）一个商品和服务的巨大回归，既包括科学、医学和技术上的，也包括音乐、文学和艺术上的。这一多面繁荣的第二重愿景补充了和平、正义和民主的愿景。最终的目标是实现人类古老的梦想，正如希伯来先知以赛亚描述的那样：“他们应该把剑铸成犁头，把矛变成镰刀。”（偃武修文）  自由民主党长久以来就梦想着把通常用于战争的力量用于经济和文化的当务之急。而且，当和平成为主导之后，人们会认为并不是只有物质繁荣是亟待实现的。这里有一个的基本的问题：在社区内部适用的东西在全球范围内也能够同样有效吗？通过经济、科技和文化的竞争，能否先存在一个和平和法律的有序系统，这样一个个体首先活跃其中的广泛综合的社会？事实上，并没有一个预期的社会作为终结，重要的是个体与其他个体相关而非只有一个或少数。  法律和政治哲学接受并认可第二个愿景，但反对通过市场的政治镇压而将其绝对化。人们经常会听到，做决定的不再是民主负责的政府官员而是跨国公司和企业家。在世界的许多角落，经济宿命论已经占统治地位，它宣称“经济同时决定着手段与目的”。经纪掮客们的目的是排斥政治，因为政治需要的是被动的遵守，而不是积极主动的做什么。当然，事实上并没有什么无名的力量在起作用。全球化被公开命名和公开承认的人、组织和运动促进，正如前面提到的世界市场自由化的协议。并且，由于国内市场正被迫遵守某些更加一般的规则和内部设置，全球市场的类似设置并不会被先天的排除。政治本身（事实上是国际的而非国家的）要么征服市场的力量，要么通过竞争的准则或是社会因素及最小的生态条件迫使他们转而成为一项公平的设置。  国际社会应当并且必须使某些事情，如个体和群体的创造力、自由竞争以及自然天赋和潜能的概率分布，凭其自身而发挥作用。但在许多情况下，形成社会和政治事件的权力和责任也是必须的。因此我们必须这样问：如果法律和公正代替个人权力去统治，如果法律和公正在某国之内被民主地形成，它是否应当在各个层面都同样适用呢（既在国家内部又在国与国之间）？然后，是否需要在民主机构的基础上建立一个全球法律体系来负责促进法律和公正呢？难道对于全球化时代最好的政治回应在于一种从单个国家到世界民主的民主扩展（人们也可称之为“世界共和国”）？鉴于上述全球化的三个维度，任何此类世界共和国应该都能依据与这三个维度相对应的三个点而被评判：（1）是否适当的挑战了“暴力的社会”；（2）是否成功促进全球“合作的社会”；（3）是否考虑到共命运社会必须提到的贫穷和苦难。  5）五项异议  我希望这些对于全球化时代的观点和回应能够引人注目。鉴于它们需要与当代政治现实的彻底决裂，我想预言并提出某些异议，并将探讨其中看起来意义重大的五项。第一项异议由康德提出。康德提出，世界共和国是一头怪兽，因其庞大和无形而无法管理。这是一个合理的批判吗？对有28,500居民的利希滕斯坦公民来说，有650万居民的瑞士是巨大的，而有2亿6500万居民的美国无异于一头怪兽，更遑论8亿5000万人口的印度和11亿人口的中国。当一个美国大小的社区（几乎是利希滕斯坦的10000倍，瑞士的40倍）可以被很好的管理时，第一个批判具有便具有某种独断性，但它本身很难成为一个反对世界共和国国观念的毁灭性论证。鉴于它所建议的，这一批判确实可被视为有建设性的。在能够防止自身的管理不善以及与之相应的潜在过度补偿：过多的官僚主义或者极权国家的前提下，世界共和国被允许，甚至道德上需要它的存在。在此，我们需要对这一建设性的观点感到满意。世界共和国必然不会遵循联合国的模式，并且盲目的将印度或中国这样的大国和利希滕斯坦这样的小国融合在一起。应当首先在大陆和次大陆的层面上聚集政治统一体。这些新的统一体可以（在这方面，欧盟的模式具有极大的价值）在它们自己的后院处理大部分问题，而只留极少的事情给全球政府。让我们为大的区域中间统一体建立一项原则。  6）辅助性的原则  根据第二项异议，世界共和国将文明的伟大成就——人权和公民权利，置于危险当中。根据这一批判，在历史上，只有个体国家成功地保护了那些权利。这一推理路线在下列情况当中是正确的：（a）它提出了关于促进和保护人权和公民权利责任的规范声明；（b）它指出了个体国家已然成功保护权利的实证观察。在西方，人权和公民权利首先被国家保护，这确实是毫无疑问的（当然，在欧洲，人权公约也有相当大的影响。）毕竟，那些只依赖国际组织以寻求这种保护的公民过的十分糟糕。  然而，认为（a）和(b)证明只有单一的民族国家能够保护权利忽略了两件事情。一，正是西方政府首次将这些宝贵的权力置于危险当中：法国迫害胡格诺派教徒，美国，在很大程度上是作为对英国宗教不宽容的回应而建立的，允许奴隶制存在一直到19世纪中叶。所以，个体国家已经侵犯却也培养了他们的那份权利。二，世界共和国的沃土只是那些人权和公民权利已经享受过历史的某些形式的保护的地方。在人权和公民权利已经历史地建立防御的地方——部分通过国家，部分依据区域性的人权公约（如欧盟所设立的那样）——世界共和国可以不再介入。然而，当有重大侵犯人权行为出现时，只有在人道主义的干涉会引起更大危害的情况下，世界共和国才应当出面制止，虽然袖手旁观和无所作为原则上是不合理的。  正如第一个异议，第二个异议很难驳斥应对全球化而提出的那些措施。不如说，通过建设性的批判，它再次支持了我们的论证。我们同意这部分批判：它认为主权国家在保护基本权利方面仍然负首要责任。当世界共和国还是一个第二位的政府，甚至，在大的区域性管理的地区是第三位的情况下，只有单一民族国家是第一位的政府。让我们将此作为 “辅助的”世界共和国的基本条件。成为“辅助的”意味着两件事:一，共和国不能高高在上地命令什么，而是要从公民和个体国家出发，民主地作决定。它不是一个集权的世界政府，而是一个由成员国组成的世界政府：一个联邦的世界共和国。二，它的工作范围被限定在国家层面不能解决的问题上。“联邦”同时也是一个补充的世界共和国：一个包含而不是排除第一位政府的共和国。 民法和刑法的问题，劳动法与社会法的问题，规定言论自由、宗教自由和文化自由的法律的问题，这些和其他的工作仍然在个体国家原初政府的管辖权范围内。但是，由于多样的全球化，原初国家将不得不与它们的伙伴国家合作，如此将能更高效的赋予一个更高、更全球化的权威以某种责任，例如，对因不遵守国界线而引起的争端的调和以及管理国际市场的公正法则的决定。  世界共和国不仅具有辅助性，而且具有对于国际和平的原始责任和对于裁军的优先性。实践层面上，这些任务中的第一个就是要成功废除原子、生物和化学武器（ABC)。  一个辅助性的世界共和国必须警惕任何对那些已经由个体国家和它们大的区域统一体实现了的自由民主基本标准的妥协。除了辅助性，世界共和国国必须逐步发展，以便人们能够尝试新的可能性，积累经验，而首先要发展一个重要的前提：一个全球性的公共领域。建立一个公共领域的难题已经存在于欧洲，然而在全球层面上还有更多的挑战等着它。为了实现这样一个全球范围的公共领域，对于遥远的人权侵犯感到愤怒是不够的。我们也必须（这在欧洲法律中是很少发生的）引导国家内部常见的那类辩论，以便对国会的决定和立法进行准备、陪同和评论，这应当是必要的；进而提出一些新的法律。全球范围内的公共领域与一个强有力的世界共和国是密不可分的：如果没有全球范围内的公共领域，建立一个补充的和联邦的世界共和国将是不合理的。通过一场令人震惊的政变，或者由那些双眼被蒙蔽的人建立一个持续运转的全球法律体系确实是难以容忍的。  在转型时期涉及临时的世界法律体系，除了民族国际组织的法律要承担某些任务之外，国际组织将会认识到某种结构和国际合作的耐久性，它们才能实现一种包含国家地位基本因素的国际秩序。由此产生的临时体系将聚合整个国际合作的结构，以决定管理一个包含国家地位基本形态的世界政府的时间范围。  这堪称一种现实主义的国际关系理论，它将国际体系视为政府外交的工具。个体国家陷入一场彼此参与和反对的掠夺当中，以寻求影响和资源。事实上，这些国际体系不只只是个别国家之间权力斗争的竞技场，也是一个国家之间政治互动的平台。此外，国际组织自身有某种设置会议流程的权力，这样它们就能够激励某些顽固的国家参与谈判，最好的情况是，它们成为仲裁的权威。当一场冲突的军事解决方案的相对费用太高时，个体国家将会利用这些国际组织。这刚好在同样的方向上指明了国家间平衡点的相关性，它们事实上被视为世界共和国的先驱。这些国际组织帮助成员国发声并理智的实现它们的利益。  公共权威的中心责任—公正，只能在极其有限的范围内归功于国际组织。现今的标准商业涉及企图利用国际组织实现自身利益的个体国家：超级大国试图利用它们的重要性实现它们的目的，而小一些的国家则试图在数量上超越它们的竞争对手。由于这个原因，国际体系自身，它们的组织和规则，只能为准备一个世界共和国提供援助，而不能永久地替代世界共和国。  7)民主可以通向和平吗？  根据第三个异议，有一个比世界共合国更为简洁的方式去保护人权：即，每个独立国家的民主化。根据这一论点，全球和平可以通过全球民主化达到，我们必须考虑到这一点——世界范围内的和平政治活动是由世界范围内的政治活动所认可的民主手段所推动的。因此，世界共和国就变得多余。并且事实上，自由民主已经在国家内部保护着人权。当然，民主政治在这方面有更多理由。由于欧洲人权公约已经对单独国家内人权保护的程度进行过评估，每个独立国都必须支持调查过较大地域主权的世界人权委员会的创立。（以美国为例，因为死刑，即使在和平的时代也不能合格。）特别注意的是，独立国家需要被保护：其领土完整及其民族自决权。  考虑到侵略的危险，当下的政治学已经与著名的康德的政治理论联姻，即自由民主国家，或者康德后来称之为共和国。这种理论仅有轻微的侵略他国的倾向。康德并没有假设民主公民真正地偏好和平，但却假设了受教导的利己主义会带来大致的和平倾向。民主主义“需要公民投票”来发起战争。更进一步看，“因为他们将不得不决定去承担战争给他们自己带来的困苦（他们自己必须进行真枪实弹的战斗，并从自己的财产中匀出部分来支付战争的消耗，以重建战后留下的可怜的废墟）”他们将根本不会开始这个“如此糟糕的”游戏。  然而，历史需要怀疑主义。新法兰西共和国使战争在欧洲大陆蔓延并且自始至终追寻着其帝国自身的利益。美国，尽管是更老的共和政体，在向西方扩张时，也对原住民十分的残暴。更有甚者，美国首先强占了德州，然后伙同墨西哥一起开战以进一步追寻其天命，其结果则是收获了亚利桑那州、犹他州、新墨西哥州、加利福尼亚州和内华达州。在历史上的同一时期，大不列颠王国也没有在成为世界霸主的计划上有丝毫收敛，并且扩大其英联邦，同时在其（殖民地）内部发展民主政治。由于这些原因，政治学家们不得不弱化他们的主张：民主，基本上并不和平。最好这个主张是真的，一方面是因为民主国家的实现需要某些非常高的标准，另一方面是因为民主国家的排外性。在面对其他民主国家而不是非民主国家时，只有民主共和国才能表现出和平关系的倾向。  但实际上仍有被保留的部分提出。一方面，一些要素——如女权、工人阶级的权力以及提高全民受教育水平——在早期民主制以及议会的参战决策中和公众的预期讨论中都是缺失的。但是参战通常需要广泛的民众支持，否则“更民主化的民主制”将很难就此作出决定。而另一方面，受教导的利己主义不会永远反对战争。本国人民很少感受到发生在远方的战争带来的苦难，而当敌人明显更弱时，他们就更加不会感受到苦难。远离国土的战争可以分散国内的政治冲突，还会造成群众性的歇斯底里。更进一步说，国外的战争有利可图。到头来，当大部分国家变成民主制时，为和平而作的准备就被削弱了。现如今逐渐显现出的潜在的冲突与商业政策和生态问题密切相关，这意味着在重大的经济形势及社会问题的影响下，这些冲突的波及范围会不断扩大。即使不到发生战争的程度，还是会有大量的法律问题存在。  因此，去建立一个合法的、政府性命令的普遍责任仍旧是有意义的，它以建设性批判的形式再次出现。已经通过世界范围内的民主化实现了的对人权与和平的保护，或许已经被意识到了。独立国家宣称——就像个人所做的那样——可能存在的冲突已经通过权力以外的其他方式被解决了。应该尽量通过法律途径解决这些冲突，事实上，这需要建立世界法律，并最终建立一个世界共和国。  依照第四种批判，如果满足其前提条件，那就只能有一个世界法律体系，但事实上这一条件——人类共有的正义感，关于对错的道德标准的世界范围内的意识——并没有得到满足。我们知道，这样一种普遍的正义感在西方已经缺失。以下这个小例子就能充分说明：关于美国的法律补偿金制度，任何人都会发现，某些情况在美国能得到数百万美元，而在德国最多得到一万德国马克，好像我们生活在不同的法制星球一样。在对待死亡罚款的态度上展现出更大的差异，而在某些伊斯兰国家的体罚问题以及中国、古巴、北朝鲜对政见不同者的处理上，这些差异表现得更为明显。另一方面，还有一些重要的共性：法律的平等性和公正性还有听取他方陈述以及无罪假设的法律程序，在法律的适用过程中逐步被意识到。进一步地，几乎所有的法律秩序都发现了权利主体的共同的基本的善：身体、生命、财产和荣誉。由联合国所制定的人权惯例法为平民提供更多的证据。唯一缺乏的是以无偏见且有效的方式强制实行那些标准所必须的准备。出于这个原因，通过对第四个批判的思考而提出的建设性批判几近明晰：要展开世界范围内的正义感还需要时间。但是已经显现出来的共同基础着实值得注意。在此基础之上，世界法庭已经成为可能，其中包括了国际法庭、海事法庭以及最近的、还未获批的国际司法法庭。  8)差异的权力  根据第五和最后的批判，我们可以发现，我们在全球化的进程中受到平缓的文化个性的威胁。对此的回应，即是说，我们必须尊重这个世界的社会文化财富所依赖的个性，尤其是与其自身独特的传统相关联的个人身份认同。这些批判是由近代杰出的共产主义者提出的，这些人为“好栅栏”辩护，提出用民族隔离取代全球统一。对于艾丽斯代尔·马克·因戴尔和迈克尔·沃尔则这样的哲学家来说，以他们为例，最高级的社会联合——在其中，正义、团结等道德和政治观念是有意义且有所指——只有在独立国家中才能见到。而且确实，许多国家都建立在其国民的普遍历史的基础之上，每个国家都有它独特的传统、文化以及语言，根据情况，甚至明确规定了多种语言。它们还跟随共同的价值取向，而在一个全球国家内消解了各个独立国家，则会限制人类的价值。在此之上，组织的身份认同就受到威胁，到最后甚至是价值的根本来源：个人，尽管如此却不是孤立的人。先不管所有个体，人们通常最终都会面对这一结局，即个人从属于某个组织，这一观点仍有争议。这些组织加强了“团结”的力量，即对人类愿意帮助友邻的精准定义。尤其是，每个组织都有正确的权力去追随它所认为的普遍的善的典范——条件是这与自由民主的要求相一致。  这样一种选择民族个性的权力——参考选择“差异”的权力——由于（建立）权利的普遍准则缺乏充分的决心而得到赞成，因为根据后者，首先人权就只能在社会规范中处于第二级。不过当他们应对特殊问题和各类情况时的“应用”通向的是足以覆盖具体行动的普遍规则。但是特殊问题和各类情况都没有只允许一种解释。历史、文化和传统同样有它们的权力。  让我们想象一个理想的立法者，作为一种思维实验，类似于梭伦这样的，甚至是——因为演说家更喜欢——一个理想的议会，让我们引导他或它建立起对所有文化同样公平有效的法律。与经验中存在的立法者相反，我们的理想的立法者知道所有与他的职位相关的知识；他无所不知。我们的立法者丝毫不被个人利益与情感偏好所污染，他使自己极度适应正义的原则，有其是那些与人权相关的部分：我们的立法者是完全正义的。如此神奇的立法者就可以为正义的法律建立框架。然而他发现，从正义的立场来看，很难找到一个单一的解决办法。甚至没有人能够从舒适、耐用等各类标准中找到一个合适的位置，也无法找到一个法律的准确定义的规范，而这一规范又是从正义的原则中衍生出来的。起源于历史和传统的文化特性属于自然要素的财富，必须被包含在内，其中还有不同的选择、较次要的设置以及其他纯粹的习俗相关的对象。经济与其他事物也有其位置。  多亏了他那无限的知识，这个理想的梭伦知道这些特性。多亏了他那公平与正义，他才会想让正义超过与之竞争的其他特性。因此他平等地承认它们。其结果只在第一眼看来是矛盾的：有关正义的跨文化基础性原则对于不同的文化都是开放的，而普遍原则可能会通过一种特殊的形式表达出来。在这里，在对文化开放的道德普世论中，两者——我们理想的梭伦和理想的议会——都能找到他们的界限。而且因为这些界限，就需要一种参与性的民主制。在数学中，事情有所不同：理想的毕达哥拉斯没有理想的梭伦的界限。当民主的演说寻找比建立普遍真实的人权还更多的东西时，当它发觉对历史背景和政治决策的需要时，然后它也会发觉一种“成为差异的权力”。这二者确实是不可分割的：我们授予越多的权力去参与民主，我们就越能认清普遍原则所需的全部决心的缺乏，也需要提供更多差异的权力。不然民主就会为这个理想的立法者简化成执行机构。  现在让我们以宗教信仰自由为例。作为一个基本人权，考虑到宗教的实践过程，即拒绝任何社区组织，拒绝否定信仰中分享的权利，拒绝思想自由和无神论，甚至拒绝宗教与社会共存，它需要宗教宽容。（宣称背叛是罪，甚至是死罪的宗教，对人权造成巨大的侵犯。）在此底线以上，或许需要宗教的消极自由，宗教最低限度的积极自由，即虔诚地发展自身的权力，最终建立起一个宗教共同体。这两种需求，作为人权宣言的第十八条，允许大量的开放观点存在。信仰自由并不排斥那些将自身理解为耶稣、犹太人、伊斯兰教或是日本神道的组织。人权并不需要法律及宪法规则中强烈的反宗教或无神论的布置。因此，不同的形式是正当的，就如同法国的政权还俗主义（laicism），通过强有力地分裂教会与国家克服雨格诺派突如其来的迫害——在阿尔萨斯，洛林自此分离。作为一个为了躲避宗教组织的迫害而建立起的庇护所，美国照顾到了“善意的中立”的习惯。而德国，就像澳大利亚和瑞士的部分地区一样，允许教会与国家之间制度上的联系，但在宪法的核心集团或政治核心中坚决拒绝这一联系。根据改革后国立教会的定义，斯堪的纳维亚的国家，以及其他方面的英国，其教会拥有国立的角色。而以色列允许基督教徒、德鲁斯教徒和穆斯林全部的信仰自由，甚至允许宗教自身对个人、婚姻、家庭律法的审判权，即使对其信徒们授予了特权。例如，宗教开支的三分之一由国家支付而三分之二由公社支付。而像马来西亚这样的多元文化国家，有三种完全不通的发力系统复杂地共生着：“土生土长的”习俗法，伊斯兰教教法，英国普通法。  而这些精致细节之后紧跟着权衡权力的任务，这再一次——由于随之而来的 “不完全决定论”——通过不同的群体而不同地进行。有关新闻自由的考虑与这个例子相关：有人——以维权的名义——允许了用影视（出于电视传播的目的）侵权行为——就如同财产侵害、绑架甚至种族屠杀一样，来取代干涉它吗？另一个例子：有人允许所谓的公众人物无视必要的隐私权，或许甚至侵害了这一权利？在犯罪进程中的证据已十分明显，且问题已经出现时，在相互冲突的权力中做出选择也是必要的。在此，为了人权而维护必要的隐私范围，与对于维护人权同样重要的打击犯罪活动，必须一决高下。更进一步，在自由的积极权利的范围内，由于缺乏而被迫选择的现实，就必须考虑另一个问题：健康的服务或教育应该接受多少资源？最终，或许人们应该衡量福利国家与个人责任动机和个人主动性所带来的收益。  显然，普遍原则的不充份决定论有着深远的影响。选择不同的权力的根基，即普遍认可的个性，正是通过它自身与选择个性的权力相比较，而后者不是不管（普遍的道德），而是正因为普遍的道德应归功于人类。因为成为不同的权力应该是非世界共和国，它强烈反对共产主义者所支持的单一民族国家。根据查尔斯·贝兹等政治理论家的观点，全球政治秩序应该建成一个与单一国家相似的同质性世界共和国。 在他的设想中，可能的细分只能从上至下地次生地产生，与单一民族国家相反，作为一种对个性的表达，而失去他们的权力。但成为差异的权力则与这一理论相悖。  我们对社群主义的建设性批评说，他们的职位是有价值的，然而关于它究竟是什么有价值，才进行了三分之一。人类确实有权力拥有特质：他们的历史、传统、宗教信仰以及语言、文化和良好的群落中共有的想法。因为这些特质的差异增加了人类的社会与文化财富，成为差异的权力能被观察到就是十分重要的。然而在这条进路的三分之二处，也就是社群主义者未能完成的地方，表明因为获得了不妥协的防护，作为结果的单一民族国家不会在其自身中结束。作为为了人类利益而存在的组织们，它们能够为了它们的利益而自己改变自己。它们能够分解自己、改革自己，从而成为既更小又更大的组织。  这条进路的最后三分之一，共产主义者所没有实现的最终的延伸，国家和外国公民都没有从普遍法律和政治规则中解脱出来。相关的原则被称为联邦制。只有联邦能够成为道德上合法的世界共和国。  对世界共和国来说可以考虑到的民主合法化的策略有三种。根据将其合法性仅置于人民上的那个，世界国家将会从世界全部人口的意志中诞生——包含了世界共和国的全部公民。因为个人们在合法性上有最终话语权，某人可以将这一策略视为恰当的。由于国家的利益通过其公民而合法化，个人可以消除个别国家，把这当做一种附加权力。单国家的权力抨击这一点。事实与此相去甚远，集体的利益不会沦为其成员利益之和。因此提出第二个民主合法化的策略。因为单一国家既可以代表每个公民所分配的利益，也能代表人口的集体利益，有人会想去剔除最初的合法化，并且保卫单一国家唯一、排他的合法性，作为伴随着的结果，单一国家的集体意志来下决定。但这对喜欢个性的成员有所限制，他们基本上是合法化的决策当局，并且可以自由延展到国家边界以外。这些成员包括宗教、语言和职业，要求兴趣或政治利益，像国际特赦组织、绿色和平组织、无国界医生等由组织来代表，更进一步，还有那些有文化的分散人民，如爱尔兰人、犹太人和库尔德人。  因为“这些成员越过了国界”，这些国家的单一、排外的合法化就被排除了，因此只剩下第三个策略——联合的合法化。世界共和国，通过公民合法化和单一国家合法化的连结，赢得了民主合法化。因此，世界共和国的全部权利都来自于这个双重支持者：这个全人类和所有国家的共同体。并且这个双重合法化必须在这个世界国家的组织中得到表现。其中最重要的机构——议会，必须由两个内庭组成，公民组成的上庭和国家组成的下庭。此时，在这样特别的体制装配中，个人不必思考太多。利希滕斯坦在印度或中国，不会被认为有同样的分量。究竟是何种分量，将会被政治地决定。不论如何，更大的地区仲裁机构可以改变这一局面。  9)最终的平衡：分级的世界主义  世界政府，根据普遍义务而存在并因此去建立法制和民主的规则，将会需要一个辅助者，进一步说就是一个联邦的世界共和国。在其中，我们是公民，但不是排外的，而是一种互补意义上的公民。排外性设想中的公民与自我定义的世界主义烙印相关——与黑格尔的权力的哲学(§209, Note)一同出现——“与具体观念中的政治生活相反”。排外的世界主义者，也不是没有其优势，说到：‘我既不是德国人、法国人，也不是瑞士人，而是一个世界的自由公民。’在此世界政府代替了单独国家，并且国际公民权取代了国家基础上的公民权。在世界政府的管理之下，个人是一个世界公民而不是某一个特殊的单独国家中的公民。然而联邦的世界共和国，在简化过的选项——“国家化还是全球化”和“单独国家还是世界主义”——之上。国际公民权不会取代国家公民权，而是第一个补充第二个。在某种程度上说，它实现了戴高乐的全球性辩护：分散的“家园”组成的世界以及大型地区性国体，但是，与戴高乐的理论也相去甚远，它拥有特别的并且（直到现在仍旧未知的）多重身份的公民。某人首先是德国人、法国人或是意大利人，其次才是欧洲公民，欧洲的民主将在未来的数年内决定下来。最后，某人首先是一个单独国家的公民其次才是欧洲公民，亦或是相反，就根本不重要了。在等级观念中，某人将会同时两者都是，并且在第三个等级上成为一门世界公民：一个联邦的、辅助的世界共和国的公民。  10)全球的公众  运行一个社会所必不可少的公共机构就是政治的公众（参考Höffe 1999/2007, ch. 4.3.3），要使问题上升为让大规模区域性工会——如欧盟——众所皆知的程度，它是必不可少的。在世界国家的情况下，这些问题更加恶化，我们看向另一个、也是今天的最后一个异议：没有世界公众、全球的公众的世界国家，是不合理的。  幸运的是，朝向全球政治公众的尝试已经得到证实了。例如，他们发现，在媒体上报道世界范围内的侵权行为，事实上会引起每个地方的“普遍大众”的反应。康德将自己的时代陈述为“某个地方的侵权行为感觉像遍及了整个世界” (Frieden, 3rd definitive article: VIII 60)。然而，他既没有将注意力放在对侵权有选择性的偏见的危害上，也没有将注意力放在那些可以听到的相反的声音：集体歧视，民族优越性甚至那些违反法律破坏和平的倡议。也因此，有效的全球性公众场合就有更多认为需要完成，远远不止仅仅是发泄对侵权不满的媒体。  根据这公众原则的三个策略（参考Höffe 1999/2007, ch. 4.3），全球政治活动，首先以一种公共的方式发生，从而所有的公民都能参与进去。其次，每个公民都可以投票而且能够代表最终决策机构的部门，即立法。第三，公民将不会有临时选区，可能会通过永远的民意测验来补充；当然，政策将由全体公民共同执行，即使它可以被少数且有限的议会即众议院专业地执行。在参与性民主中，普遍大众是所有政治机构必须应对的重要公众机构——不仅仅是政府，还有国会，司法所和立宪法院。  我们以立法部门为例：世界国家，与独立国家一样，需要大量辩论，从而使之得以开始、准备并且连同议会辩论一起，如果必要的话还有随后进一步的修正案。为了保证这些讨论实际发生，就需要大量的跨国界和超越国家的机构。毋庸置疑，已经存在大量的国际无政府组织，其中的某些组织更是拥有可观的影响力。他们能够说服（通过民主甚至强迫的手段）政府、公司以及其他组织，以参与进入与普遍公众的对话中去，并且接收形式与实质中最低限度的要求。他们有时甚至会组织公民进行跨界抗议。然而，这些组织中的绝大多数——媒体，政治、文化、教会的学院，基层运作，党派与社团——迄今为止，仍是在“国家范围内”运转，即在特殊的独立国家的界限中。与之相比，在全球水平中，不得不承认有大量的不足。  在通过建立有效的全球公众的方式来克服这个不足的进程中，使各方面的利益、声音和语言获得同样水平的关注是非常重要的。法律上的要求是普遍认可且无异议的：全球公众需要新闻自由、言论自由和集会自由。消极的自由需要由（新闻的）积极自由来补充，例如以出台反垄断法的形式。在这些方式的推动下，产生了大量的媒体竞争，政治学院和基层活动。关于垄断、寡头经济、以及其他方面的联合企业的禁令，只能在竞争环境下被证明为正当的（参考ch. 15.1）。与之相比，在政治公众环境下，就能找到额外的促进民主的理由：新闻的积极自由，对于运作中的参与性民主来说是必不可少的。处于同样的理由，还需要足够的受教育程度，从而在公民在建立起最低限度的自由。对于不依赖于文字的文化来说，英语自身并不符合道德法则，但在世界性的社会中，媒体则扮演了一个具有影响力的角色，逐渐成为一个无法避免的约束。  但是，即使当新闻的积极和消极自由都有保障时，各种各样的利益也根本不能获得同等的公众关注度。在现存的诸多危险（参考Höffe 1999, 2007, ch. 4.3）中，我只注意到一个：某一种特殊语言的霸权。正是因为有生命力的语言不仅仅是一个利益中立的沟通手段，这一现象才会出现。支配性语言的媒体具有更大的影响力，因此绘画、象征符号、神话以及对相关文化的兴趣占据了优势地位。而且，与那些口头传承的文化比起来，以文字为基础的文化也占据了更为重要的地位。  在独立国家中，公众是随制度而变化的：它发生在不同的级别，不拥有明确的边界，覆盖了所有专业领域及其影响，从学术专门讨论到小报新闻，就像光谱的一头到另一条一样。自从公众利用不同的媒体和手段来处理并使不同的事物说得通，它就不是在单数中，而是在复数中，作为重叠公众的花束一般而存在。它们中的许多都有贵族化倾向，其中职业政客以及个别媒体和组织控制了压倒性的影响。  世界社会凭借它更大的规模和多样性，被打上了更大的现象的标记。然而全球公众已经发展得相当好了，特别是在人权领域。在各种有识之士的引导下，进行了有关人权的系列讨论，他们包括了独立科学家、哲学家，媒体评论员，人权组织，专业协会，重要国家的媒体和公众舆论以及相关的会议和出版物。高等法庭之间的互动具有与之相似的重大意义。即使是国家自身也不会忽视这些，因为在美国与其他国际组织之间，他们是真正批准人权的会议，如此一来，就使全球水平的人权的法治化改革成为可能。  不管对全球公众发展状况的评价有多么乐观或悲观，第九和最后一个否决将以从属物的形式提出：既然没有一个有效的全球公众，建立一个辅助的联邦的世界共和国就是不负责任的。  全球公众对另一个任务也是不可缺少的：普遍的政治统一性的发展包含了对世界公民身份的意识和批判性世界记忆。对世界公民身份的意识反倒是全球性公民投票的前提。假设世界范围内公民投票和普通投票的概念具有广泛的说服力的话，只有在以彻底且公平的方式讨论过相关的问题后，存在对世界公民身份的意识和世界政治公众的情况下，它才是可靠的。在此，威胁也渐渐浮现，因而需要相应的对策：为了防止那六到八个人口最多的国家的决策挤压其他国家的利益，以瑞士为首的其他国家就可能会被迫服从这一决策，因此就需要双重多数：全球性公民投票需要国家以及世界人口，两者的大多数。  11）国家的权利  只要市民坚持并利用他们的个体地位，个体和国家的相似性就会产生新的人权。这项权利的内容并不新鲜，但那些有权宣布它的则是。这是一项国家的人权，并凭借这一潜在类比的有限适用性而置于反转当中。为避免误解，它们最好被称为国家权利，因为国家被视为法人实体，而公民被作为整体保护着。  行动能力的条件同样适用于作为法人实体的国家和作为集体的公民。这只见于一种相互作用，一种现在发生于国际层面的相互作用当中。类似于个人消极的自由权利，三种相对先验的、被严格定义的、作为先验的挑战而依赖于相互作用的利益出现了，并且具有国家权利的地位。  首先，国家像个人一样有赋形和解散的权利，因为公民的而生活不但作为公民之间会惠互利的权力在内部和分配上被保护，同样于外部作为反对其他国家侵略的公民权利而被保护着。其次，存在一项集体所有权：每个公民反对外来侵略以保持其国家领土完整的权利。第三，类似于个人自主决定的权利，集体的，因此也是政治的、文化的自主决定的权利。  第四，这些消极的国家权利被一个第二位的声明所补充，根据这一声明，国家能够享有权利而不必恢复暴力和个人司法。它构成了一个国家和平的声明和国家之间的法制。第五，类似于个人的情况，存在一项民主参与的权利：在全球范围的和平和法制内部，每个国家不仅可以是一个（消极）的客体，也同样可以是一个（积极）的主体。国家在世界共和国里有同样的参与权。另外，关于是否存在自由的积极权力的问题是将在下一章（ch.15）讨论。  有人针对国家的“个人权力”而提出异议，他们是将合法的个人主义当做道德基础的规则形式而予以否定。这之所以会出现是因为国家是在“整体形而上学”的意义上被理解的：作为一个整体（holos,因此是 holistic），就意味着在其自身之中有一个终结，并且许多哲学家将这一解释看作是形而上学的观念。然而，仅仅在假设国家真的拥有“人权”而不需要引号时，这一反对才会成立。然而，国家的权力不是无条件的权力，不像真正的人权，只有在民主和法律的全球化规则可以同时外在和内在的承认的条件下，它才是有效的。实际上在这些条件下，国家的内在价值仍旧是相关的且辅助的：国家的“人权”为公民服务。  我用以下的评价来结束我的思考：公民没有保持其共同体生存的道德义务。在此，顺带一提，个人和国家之间存在一种类比关系，因为一个人活着就有法律、道德责任。但是，国家的权利禁止任何来自外界的强制。公民就必须明白已达到的道德的法治化程度，不是因为中间的整体标准的形成，或者说就这点而言，世界共和国本身而被质疑。 |